Concept

Bayesian game

Related publications (18)

Beyond Time-Average Convergence: Near-Optimal Uncoupled Online Learning via Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Update

In this paper we provide a novel and simple algorithm, Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Updates (CMWU), for convergence to \textit{Coarse Correlated Equilibria} (CCE) in general games. CMWU effectively corresponds to the standard MWU algorithm but where ...

2022

Informational frictions in financial markets

Erik Hapnes

This thesis consists of three chapters on informational frictions in financial markets. The chapters analyze problems related to markets' ability to guide real investment, and what drives liquidity. Both problems are important to ensure efficient resource ...

EPFL2021

Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets

Aris Filos Ratsikas

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its ...

AAAI Press2019

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

Thomas Alois Weber

To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment meas ...

2019

Moving Horizon Demand and State Estimation for Model Predictive Perimeter Control of Large-scale Urban Networks

Nikolaos Geroliminis, Isik Ilber Sirmatel

Perimeter control schemes proposed to alleviate congestion in large-scale urban networks usually assume perfect knowledge of the accumulation state and inflow demands, both requiring information about the origins and destinations of drivers. Such assumptio ...

IEEE2019

Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation without Regret

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller endeavors to sell multiple goods to a single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for the goods range over a rectangular uncertainty set. We interpret this pr ...

2022

A Robust Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox

Thomas Alois Weber

Newcomb's problem is viewed as a dynamic game with an agent and a superior being as players. Depending on whether or not a risk-neutral agent's confidence in the superior being, as measured by a subjective probability assigned to the move order, exceeds a ...

2016

A Linear Programming Model for Power Distribution with Demand Response and Variable Renewable Energ

Frédéric Louis François Babonneau, Alain Haurie

A linear programming framework is proposed to model distribution network characteristics, and market clearing processes for flexible load and distributed energy resources providing reserve and reactive power compensation. One shows that the Nash equilibriu ...

Elsevier Sci Ltd2016

On Non-cooperative Genomic Privacy

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Amalio Telenti, Erman Ayday, Mathias Jacques Jean-Marc Humbert

Over the last few years, the vast progress in genome sequencing has highly increased the availability of genomic data. Today, individuals can obtain their digital genomic sequences at reasonable prices from many online service providers. Individuals can st ...

2015

Competition of Wireless Providers for Atomic Users

Bixio Rimoldi, Vojislav Gajic

We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number ...

Ieee-Inst Electrical Electronics Engineers Inc2014

Challenges in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Paul David Dütting

This thesis addresses three challenges in algorithmic mechanism design, which seeks to devise computationally efficient mechanisms consisting of an outcome rule and a payment rule that implement desirable outcomes in strategic equilibrium. The first challe ...

EPFL2013

Decentralized Anti-coordination Through Multi-agent Learning

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer ...

AI Access Foundation2013

Non-Cooperative Location Privacy

Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Julien Freudiger, David C. Parkes

In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive for most security protocols. Unfortunately, an adversary can monitor pseudonyms used for authentication to track the location of mobile nodes. A frequently proposed solution to protect location pri ...

Ieee Computer Soc2013

Modeling an America's Cup Regatta as a Sequential Stochastic Game

Jean-Benoît Rossel

The main objective of this thesis is to model a regatta in the America’s Cup, and more precisely the first leg of the race, where the two competing sailboats have to move upwind. During the race, each crew attempts to be the first to reach the end of this ...

EPFL2013

Optimal process plan selection in networked based manufacturing using game-theoretic approach

Naoufel Cheikhrouhou

This paper proposes a scheme for generating optimal process plans for multi jobs in a networked based manufacturing system. Networked manufacturing offers several advantages in the current competitive atmosphere such as reducing short manufacturing cycle t ...

2012

Reaching Correlated Equilibria Through Multi-agent Learning

Boi Faltings, Ludek Cigler

Many games have undesirable Nash equilibria. For exam- ple consider a resource allocation game in which two players compete for an exclusive access to a single resource. It has three Nash equilibria. The two pure-strategy NE are effi- cient, but not fair. ...

2011

Risk, Unexpected Uncertainty, and Estimation Uncertainty: Bayesian Learning in Unstable Settings

Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free) reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human appreciation of uncertainty. In ou ...

2011

Strategy construction for parity games with imperfect information

Laurent Doyen

We consider two-player parity games with imperfect information in which strategies rely on observations that provide imperfect information about the history of a play. To solve such games, i.e., to determine the winning regions of players and corresponding ...

2010