Equiconsistency

In mathematical logic, two theories are equiconsistent if the consistency of one theory implies the consistency of the other theory, and vice versa. In this case, they are, roughly speaking, "as consistent as each other". In general, it is not possible to prove the absolute consistency of a theory T. Instead we usually take a theory S, believed to be consistent, and try to prove the weaker statement that if S is consistent then T must also be consistent—if we can do this we say that T is consistent relative to S. If S is also consistent relative to T then we say that S and T are equiconsistent. In mathematical logic, formal theories are studied as mathematical objects. Since some theories are powerful enough to model different mathematical objects, it is natural to wonder about their own consistency. Hilbert proposed a program at the beginning of the 20th century whose ultimate goal was to show, using mathematical methods, the consistency of mathematics. Since most mathematical disciplines can be reduced to arithmetic, the program quickly became the establishment of the consistency of arithmetic by methods formalizable within arithmetic itself. Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that Hilbert's program cannot be realized: if a consistent recursively enumerable theory is strong enough to formalize its own metamathematics (whether something is a proof or not), i.e. strong enough to model a weak fragment of arithmetic (Robinson arithmetic suffices), then the theory cannot prove its own consistency. There are some technical caveats as to what requirements the formal statement representing the metamathematical statement "The theory is consistent" needs to satisfy, but the outcome is that if a (sufficiently strong) theory can prove its own consistency then either there is no computable way of identifying whether a statement is even an axiom of the theory or not, or else the theory itself is inconsistent (in which case it can prove anything, including false statements such as its own consistency).