Duverger's lawIn political science, Duverger's law holds that single-ballot majoritarian elections with single-member districts (such as first past the post) tend to favor a two-party system. The theory is attributed to Maurice Duverger, a French sociologist who published several papers on it in the 1950s and 1960s. In the course of further research, other political scientists began calling the effect a "law" or principle. As a corollary to the law, Duverger also asserted that proportional representation favors multi-partyism, as does the plurality system with runoff elections.
Smith setIn voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, but also known as the top cycle, or as Generalized Top-Choice Assumption (GETCHA), is the smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such that each member defeats every candidate outside the set in a pairwise election. The Smith set provides one standard of optimal choice for an election outcome. Voting systems that always elect a candidate from the Smith set pass the Smith criterion and are said to be 'Smith-efficient' or to satisfy the Smith criterion.
Plurality votingPlurality voting refers to electoral systems in which a candidate(s), who poll more than any other counterpart (that is, receive a plurality), are elected. In systems based on single-member districts, it elects just one member per district and may also be referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP), single-member plurality (SMP/SMDP), single-choice voting (an imprecise term as non-plurality voting systems may also use a single choice), simple plurality or relative majority (as opposed to an absolute majority, where more than half of votes is needed, this is called majority voting).
Strategic votingStrategic voting, also called tactical voting, sophisticated voting or insincere voting, occurs in voting systems when a voter votes for a candidate or party other than their sincere preference to prevent an undesirable outcome. For example, in a simple plurality election, a voter might gain a better outcome by voting for a less preferred but more generally popular candidate. Gibbard's theorem shows that all single-winner voting methods encourage strategic voting, unless there are only two options or dictatorial (i.
