Concept

Board of directors

Related publications (7)

Hybrid Flock - Formation Control Algorithms

Alcherio Martinoli, Cyrill Silvan Baumann, Jonas Perolini, Emna Tourki

Two prominent categories for achieving coordinated multirobot displacement are flocking and navigation in formation. Both categories have their own body of literature and characteristics, including their respective advantages and disadvantages. While typic ...

Springer Nature Switzerland2022

Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

We investigate whether corporations and their executives react to an exogenous change in passive institutional ownership and alter their corporate governance structure. We find that exogenous increases in passive ownership lead to increases in CEO power an ...

Elsevier Science Sa2017

Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the boar ...

Oxford University Press2011

The impact of corporate governance practices on R&D efforts: a look at shareholders’ rights, cross-listing and control pyramid

Stéphane Lhuillery

The paper considers the impact of multiple shareholder-oriented governance practices on R&D decisions. Based on a sample of 5,528 firms belonging to 110 large French listed business groups, our results substantiate the idea that shareholder-oriented govern ...

Oxford University Press2011

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards ...

Elsevier2010

Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well, but not more likely ...

2009

Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The r ...

2008