Publications related to Auction

Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions

Daniel Kuhn, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Cagil Kocyigit

We study a robust auction design problem with a minimax regret objective, where a seller seeks a mechanism for selling multiple items to multiple anonymous bidders with additive values. The seller knows that the bidders' values range over a box uncertainty ...

2024

Distributional Robustness in Mechanism Design

Cagil Kocyigit

Mechanism design theory examines the design of allocation mechanisms or incentive systems involving multiple rational but self-interested agents and plays a central role in many societally important problems in economics. In mechanism design problems, agen ...

EPFL2020

Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

Daniel Kuhn, Cagil Kocyigit, Wolfram Wiesemann

We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has a private value that is unknown to the seller and the other bidders. The agents perceive the ensemble of all bidder values as a random v ...

2020

A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar, Sankarshan Damle

Combinatorial auctions are widely used to sell resources/items. The challenges in such auctions are multi-fold. We need to ensure that bidders, the strategic agents, bid their valuations truthfully to the auction mechanism. Besides, the agents may desire p ...

ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY2019

Distributed Multi-Unit Privacy Assured Bidding (PAB) for Smart Grid Demand Response Programs

Muhammed Fatih Balli

The stringent requirement of the demand-supply equilibrium for delivering electricity has traditionally been dealt with a supply-side perspective, assuming that the demand is not alterable. With the promises of the Smart Grid, demand- side management techn ...

2018

Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar

Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal wor ...

Springer International Publishing Ag2017

Revenue and Reserve Prices in a Probabilistic Single Item Auction

Moran Feldman

We investigate the effect of limiting the number of reserve prices on the revenue in a probabilistic single item auction. In the model considered, bidders compete for an impression drawn from a known distribution of possible types. The auction mechanism se ...

Springer Verlag2017

Online Auctions for Dynamic Assignment: Theory and Empirical Evaluation

Boi Faltings, Sujit Prakash Gujar

Dynamic resource assignment is a common problem in multi-agent systems. We consider scenarios in which dynamic agents have preferences about assignments and the resources that can be assigned using online auctions. We study the trade-off between the follow ...

Ios Press2016

Estimation of bid functions for location choice and price modeling with a latent variable approach

Michel Bierlaire, Ricardo Daniel Hurtubia González

A new approach for the estimation of bid-rent functions for residential location choice is proposed. The method is based on the bid-auction approach and considers that the expected maximum bid of the auction is a latent variable that can be related to obse ...

Springer2014

Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions

Laura Elisa Celis

Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can ...

Informs2014

Using Identity Premium for Honesty Enforcement and Whitewashing Prevention

Karl Aberer, Jie Zhang

One fundamental issue with existing reputation systems, particularly those implemented in open and decentralized environments, is whitewashing attacks by opportunistic participants. If identities are cheap, it is beneficial for a rational provider to simpl ...

Wiley-Blackwell2014

Challenges in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Paul David Dütting

This thesis addresses three challenges in algorithmic mechanism design, which seeks to devise computationally efficient mechanisms consisting of an outcome rule and a payment rule that implement desirable outcomes in strategic equilibrium. The first challe ...

EPFL2013

Trust beyond reputation: A computational trust model based on stereotypes

Anwitaman Datta, Xin Liu

Models of computational trust support users in taking decisions. They are commonly used to guide users' judgements in online auction sites; or to determine quality of contributions in Web 2.0 sites. However, most existing systems require historical informa ...

Elsevier2013

Reducing Internet Auction Fraud

Christopher Tucci

When it comes to online auctions, “caveat emptor” is an understatement. ...

Association for Computing Machinery2008

Financial Transmission Rights in Europe’s Electricity Market

Matthias Finger, Christof Lorenz Duthaler

After their theoretical development in the early 1990s, Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) have been applied in restructured US electricity markets for about a decade now. Lately, FTRs have also been proposed as a potential feature of the emerging Europe ...

2008

Multi-agent modelling of electricity markets : transaction processes and generation capacity expansion under competition

Abdelaziz Lahlou

This thesis describes the development of three conceptual models built to serve as decision support tools in liberalised electricity markets. The introduction of competition, higher uncertainty and decentralised planning requires new planning and analysis ...

EPFL2007

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