Central banks are increasingly concerned about climate-related risks and want to ensure that the financial system is resilient to them. As they integrate these risks into financial stability monitoring, they also discuss how to apply environmental criteria ...
Directors at firms with well-connected CEOs are more likely to obtain directorships at firms that are connected to the CEOs. Recommended directors do not become beholden to the CEO. Reciprocity is an important determinant of recommendations because CEOs ar ...
Past research has suggested that firms can significantly reduce their exposure to moderate exchange rate fluctuations by means of pass-through and hedging. Studying the appreciation of the Swiss franc by 17% on January 15, 2015, we show that firms remain e ...
Firms with greater financial flexibility should be better able to fund a revenue shortfall resulting from the COVID-19 shock and benefit less from policy responses. We find that firms with high financial flexibility within an industry experience a stock pr ...
We conduct a detailed analysis of investors in successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). The average ICO has 4700 contributors. The median participant contributes small amounts and many investors sell their tokens before the underlying product is developed ...
From 1973 to 2014, the common stock of U.S. banks with loan growth in the top quartile of banks over a three-year period significantly underperformed the common stock of banks with loan growth in the bottom quartile over the next three years. After the per ...
We investigate whether corporations and their executives react to an exogenous change in passive institutional ownership and alter their corporate governance structure. We find that exogenous increases in passive ownership lead to increases in CEO power an ...
We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust- ...
We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a signif ...
Are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises? If yes, why? In this paper, we show that a bank's stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis. Thi ...
Advisors often manage multiple versions of a fund. These "twins" have the same manager and similar performance but are sold to different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Comparing investor flows in retail and institutional ...
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of sharehol ...
We investigate corporate governance experts' claim that it is detrimental to a firm to reappoint former CEOs as directors after they step down as CEOs. We find that more successful and more powerful former CEOs are more likely to be reappointed to the boar ...
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate sel ...
We study trading in option strategies in the FTSE-100 index market. Trades in option strategies represent around 37% of the total number of trades and over 75% of the total trading volume in our sample. We find some evidence that order flow in volatility-s ...
Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards ...
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well, but not more likely ...
I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The r ...
We report evidence that the co-movements of index options and index futures quotes differ sharply from perfect correlation in periods with option trades. In half-hour intervals with (without) option trades 25% (12%) of call option quote changes have either ...
