Concept

Théorie des contrats

Publications associées (22)

Signaling in OTC Markets: Benefits and Costs of Transparency

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex post transparency in over-the-counter markets. Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer's rents when s ...

CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS2020

Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies

Erwan Morellec

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond firs ...

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA2020

The role of demand in fostering product vs process innovation: a model and an empirical test

Gabriele Pellegrino

While the extant innovation literature has provided extensive evidence of the so-called "demand-pull" effect, the possible diverse impact of demand evolution on product vs process innovation activities has not been yet investigated. This paper develops a f ...

SPRINGER2021

Performance Contracts for Software Network Functions

George Candea, Solal Vincenzo Pirelli, Rishabh Ramesh Iyer, Aikaterini Argyraki, Arseniy Zaostrovnykh, Luis David Figueiredo Mascarenhas Moreira Pedrosa

Software network functions (NFs), or middleboxes, promise flexibility and easy deployment of network services but face the serious challenge of unexpected performance behaviour. We propose the notion of a performance contract, a construct formulated in ter ...

USENIX ASSOC2019

Strategic Objectives For State-Owned Enterprises As A Means To Mitigate Political Interference: An Empirical Analysis Of Two Swiss State-Owned Enterprises

Matthias Finger, Fabian Liechti

When governments act as owners of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), they are both principal and agent at the same time. The literature on steering SOEs has mainly focused on the government as the principal that must control SOEs. However, the government is a ...

WILEY2019

Traffic Receipts for Network Transparency

Pavlos Nikolopoulos

Today's Internet is not transparent: when packets get lost or delayed, there is typically no information about where the problem occurred, hence no information about who is responsible. This results in Internet service providers (ISPs) offering service lev ...

EPFL2018

A View on Venetian Apprenticeship through the Garzoni Database

Giovanni Colavizza

A sample of contracts of apprenticeship from three periods in the history of early modern Venice is analysed, as recorded in the archive of the Giustizia Vecchia, a venetian magistracy. The periods are the end of the 16th century, the 1620s and the 1650s. ...

Universitas Studiorum2017

Financing rail infrastructure by multi-annual performance contracts : a case-based evaluation

Dagny Anne Greinus

After decades of public or private vertically integrated monopolies, the organisation of the European railway sector was re-structured. The European Commission has been seeking to improve the efficiency of the railways to strengthen the position of railway ...

EPFL2016

Fed funds futures variance futures

Damir Filipovic

We develop a novel contract design, the fed funds futures (FFF) variance futures, which reflects the expected realized basis point variance of an underlying FFF rate. The valuation of short-term FFF variance futures is completely model-independent in a gen ...

Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd2016

Elicitation and Aggregation of Crowd Information

Goran Radanovic

This thesis addresses challenges in elicitation and aggregation of crowd information for settings where an information collector, called center, has a limited knowledge about information providers, called agents. Each agent is assumed to have noisy private ...

EPFL2016

Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance

Stefano Colonnello

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines whether the availability of credit default swaps (CDS) has consequences for creditor governance. CDSs offer creditors the opportunity to hedge credit risk and may impact their willing ...

EPFL2015

Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?

Pierre Collin Dufresne

Using a comprehensive sample of trades from Schedule 13D filings by activist investors, we study how measures of adverse selection respond to informed trading. We find that on days when activists accumulate shares, measures of adverse selection and of stoc ...

Wiley-Blackwell2015

Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction

Thomas Alois Weber

Electronic intermediaries have become pervasive in sales transactions for many durables, such as cars, power tools, and apartments. Yet only recently have they successfully tackled the challenge of enabling parties to share such goods. A key impediment to ...

Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd2014

Virtual X-ray Reading (VXR) of Ancient Administrative Handwritten Documents

Giorgio Margaritondo, Frédéric Kaplan, Fauzia Albertin, Marco Stampanoni

The study of ancient documents is too often confined to specimens of high artistic value or to official writings. Yet, a wealth of information is often stored in administrative records such as ship records, notary papers, work contract, tax declaration, co ...

2014

Collaborative Housing and the Intermediation of Moral Hazard

Thomas Alois Weber

This paper considers intermediation in a differentiated short-term housing market where heterogeneous agents may stay at a hotel or at one of several private hosts' properties, below or above hotel quality. The collaborative-housing market fails when agent ...

Ieee2014

CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

We study changes in chief executive officer (CEO) contracts when firms transition from public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a signif ...

Elsevier2013

Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets

Semyon Malamud

We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermedi ...

Elsevier2013

Designing Service Level Contracts for Supply Chain Coordination

Ralf Seifert

Supply contracts are used to coordinate the activities of the supply chain partners. In many industries, service level-based supply contracts are commonly used. Under such a contract, a company agrees to achieve a certain service level and to pay a financi ...

2012

Designing Service Level Contracts for Supply Chain Coordination

Ralf Seifert

Working Paper, University of Cologne, Germany2010

Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The r ...

2008