Publications de Ognjen Glamocanin

The Side-channel Metrics Cheat Sheet

Francesco Regazzoni, Mirjana Stojilovic, Dorian Ros, Ognjen Glamocanin

Side-channel attacks exploit a physical observable originating from a cryptographic device in order to extract its secrets. Many practically relevant advances in the field of side-channel analysis relate to security evaluations of cryptographic functions a ...

2023

RDS: FPGA Routing Delay Sensors for Effective Remote Power Analysis Attacks

Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, David Spielmann

State-of-the-art sensors for measuring FPGA voltage fluctuations are time-to-digital converters (TDCs). They allow detecting voltage fluctuations in the order of a few nanoseconds. The key building component of a TDC is a delay line, typically implemented ...

2023

Practical Implementations of Remote Power Side-Channel and Fault-Injection Attacks on Multitenant FPGAs

Francesco Regazzoni, Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, Dina Gamaleldin Ahmed Shawky Mahmoud

Cloud computing environments increasingly provision FPGAs because of their fine-grained, highly parallel, and flexible hardware architecture. The availability of FPGAs in the cloud fueled research on the security risks associated with exposing FPGA fabric ...

Springer, Cham2023

Temperature Impact on Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks on Shared FPGAs

Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, Mathias Josef Payer, Hajira Shafqat Bazaz

To answer the growing demand for hardware acceleration, Amazon, Microsoft, and many other major cloud service providers have included field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in their datacenters. However, researchers have shown that cloud FPGAs, when shared ...

IEEE2023

Instruction-Level Power Side-Channel Leakage Evaluation of Soft-Core CPUs on Shared FPGAs

Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, Mathias Josef Payer, Shashwat Shrivastava, Jinwei Yao, Nour Ardo

Side-channel disassembly attacks recover CPU instructions from power or electromagnetic side-channel traces measured during code execution. These attacks typically rely on physical access, proximity to the victim device, and high sampling rate measuring in ...

2023

Active Wire Fences for Multitenant FPGAs

Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, Andela Kostic, Stasa Kostic

When spatially shared among multiple tenants, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are vulnerable to remote power side-channel analysis attacks. Using carefully crafted on-chip voltage sensors, adversaries can extract secrets (e.g., encryption keys or th ...

2023

Instruction-Level Power Side-Channel Leakage Evaluation of Soft-Core CPUs on Shared FPGAs

Mirjana Stojilovic, Ognjen Glamocanin, Mathias Josef Payer, Shashwat Shrivastava

This repository contains the design files and software required to reproduce the results in the paper "Instruction-Level Power Side-Channel Leakage Evaluation of Soft-Core CPUs on Shared FPGAs" by Ognjen Glamocanin, Shashwat Shrivastava, Jinwei Yao, Nour A ...

EPFL Infoscience2023

Evaluating, Exploiting, and Hiding Power Side-Channel Leakage of Remote FPGAs

Ognjen Glamocanin

The pervasive adoption of field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in both cyber-physical systems and the cloud has raised many security issues. Being integrated circuits, FPGAs are susceptible to fault and power side-channel attacks, which require physical ...

EPFL2023

Improving First-Order Threshold Implementations of SKINNY

Andrea Felice Caforio, Ognjen Glamocanin, Subhadeep Banik, Daniel Patrick Collins

Threshold Implementations have become a popular generic technique to construct circuits resilient against power analysis attacks.In this paper, we look to devise efficient threshold circuits for the lightweight block cipher family SKINNY. The only threshol ...

Springer2021

Built-in Self-Evaluation of First-Order Power Side-Channel Leakage for FPGAs

Francesco Regazzoni, Mirjana Stojilovic, Louis Coulon, Ognjen Glamocanin

Embedded and cyber-physical systems are pervading all aspects of our lives, including sensitive and critical ones. As a result, they are an alluring target for cyber attacks. These systems, whose implementation is often based on reconfigurable hardware, ar ...

2020

Are Cloud FPGAs Really Vulnerable to Power Analysis Attacks?

Francesco Regazzoni, Mirjana Stojilovic, Louis Coulon, Ognjen Glamocanin

Recent works have demonstrated the possibility of extracting secrets from a cryptographic core running on an FPGA by means of remote power analysis attacks. To mount these attacks, an adversary implements a voltage fluctuation sensor in the FPGA logic, rec ...

IEEE2020