Forcing (mathematics)In the mathematical discipline of set theory, forcing is a technique for proving consistency and independence results. Intuitively, forcing can be thought of as a technique to expand the set theoretical universe to a larger universe by introducing a new "generic" object . Forcing was first used by Paul Cohen in 1963, to prove the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis from Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
Foundations of mathematicsFoundations of mathematics is the study of the philosophical and logical and/or algorithmic basis of mathematics, or, in a broader sense, the mathematical investigation of what underlies the philosophical theories concerning the nature of mathematics. In this latter sense, the distinction between foundations of mathematics and philosophy of mathematics turns out to be vague. Foundations of mathematics can be conceived as the study of the basic mathematical concepts (set, function, geometrical figure, number, etc.
Axiom of pairingIn axiomatic set theory and the branches of logic, mathematics, and computer science that use it, the axiom of pairing is one of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. It was introduced by as a special case of his axiom of elementary sets. In the formal language of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms, the axiom reads: In words: Given any object A and any object B, there is a set C such that, given any object D, D is a member of C if and only if D is equal to A or D is equal to B.
Axiom schema of specificationIn many popular versions of axiomatic set theory, the axiom schema of specification, also known as the axiom schema of separation, subset axiom scheme or axiom schema of restricted comprehension is an axiom schema. Essentially, it says that any definable subclass of a set is a set. Some mathematicians call it the axiom schema of comprehension, although others use that term for unrestricted comprehension, discussed below.
Axiom schema of replacementIn set theory, the axiom schema of replacement is a schema of axioms in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF) that asserts that the of any set under any definable mapping is also a set. It is necessary for the construction of certain infinite sets in ZF. The axiom schema is motivated by the idea that whether a class is a set depends only on the cardinality of the class, not on the rank of its elements. Thus, if one class is "small enough" to be a set, and there is a surjection from that class to a second class, the axiom states that the second class is also a set.
New FoundationsIn mathematical logic, New Foundations (NF) is an axiomatic set theory, conceived by Willard Van Orman Quine as a simplification of the theory of types of Principia Mathematica. Quine first proposed NF in a 1937 article titled "New Foundations for Mathematical Logic"; hence the name. Much of this entry discusses NF with urelements (NFU), an important variant of NF due to Jensen and clarified by Holmes. In 1940 and in a revision in 1951, Quine introduced an extension of NF sometimes called "Mathematical Logic" or "ML", that included proper classes as well as sets.
Axiom of regularityIn mathematics, the axiom of regularity (also known as the axiom of foundation) is an axiom of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory that states that every non-empty set A contains an element that is disjoint from A. In first-order logic, the axiom reads: The axiom of regularity together with the axiom of pairing implies that no set is an element of itself, and that there is no infinite sequence (an) such that ai+1 is an element of ai for all i.
Universe (mathematics)In mathematics, and particularly in set theory, , type theory, and the foundations of mathematics, a universe is a collection that contains all the entities one wishes to consider in a given situation. In set theory, universes are often classes that contain (as elements) all sets for which one hopes to prove a particular theorem. These classes can serve as inner models for various axiomatic systems such as ZFC or Morse–Kelley set theory. Universes are of critical importance to formalizing concepts in inside set-theoretical foundations.
Constructible universeIn mathematics, in set theory, the constructible universe (or Gödel's constructible universe), denoted by , is a particular class of sets that can be described entirely in terms of simpler sets. is the union of the constructible hierarchy . It was introduced by Kurt Gödel in his 1938 paper "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum-Hypothesis".
Second-order arithmeticIn mathematical logic, second-order arithmetic is a collection of axiomatic systems that formalize the natural numbers and their subsets. It is an alternative to axiomatic set theory as a foundation for much, but not all, of mathematics. A precursor to second-order arithmetic that involves third-order parameters was introduced by David Hilbert and Paul Bernays in their book Grundlagen der Mathematik. The standard axiomatization of second-order arithmetic is denoted by Z2.
Second-order logicIn logic and mathematics, second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic, which itself is an extension of propositional logic. Second-order logic is in turn extended by higher-order logic and type theory. First-order logic quantifies only variables that range over individuals (elements of the domain of discourse); second-order logic, in addition, also quantifies over relations. For example, the second-order sentence says that for every formula P, and every individual x, either Px is true or not(Px) is true (this is the law of excluded middle).
Axiom of empty setIn axiomatic set theory, the axiom of empty set is a statement that asserts the existence of a set with no elements. It is an axiom of Kripke–Platek set theory and the variant of general set theory that Burgess (2005) calls "ST," and a demonstrable truth in Zermelo set theory and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, with or without the axiom of choice. In the formal language of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms, the axiom reads: or in words: There is a set such that no element is a member of it.
Aleph numberIn mathematics, particularly in set theory, the aleph numbers are a sequence of numbers used to represent the cardinality (or size) of infinite sets that can be well-ordered. They were introduced by the mathematician Georg Cantor and are named after the symbol he used to denote them, the Hebrew letter aleph (). The cardinality of the natural numbers is (read aleph-nought or aleph-zero; the term aleph-null is also sometimes used), the next larger cardinality of a well-ordered set is aleph-one then and so on.
Russell's paradoxIn mathematical logic, Russell's paradox (also known as Russell's antinomy) is a set-theoretic paradox published by the British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell in 1901. Russell's paradox shows that every set theory that contains an unrestricted comprehension principle leads to contradictions. The paradox had already been discovered independently in 1899 by the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo. However, Zermelo did not publish the idea, which remained known only to David Hilbert, Edmund Husserl, and other academics at the University of Göttingen.
Naive set theoryNaive set theory is any of several theories of sets used in the discussion of the foundations of mathematics. Unlike axiomatic set theories, which are defined using formal logic, naive set theory is defined informally, in natural language. It describes the aspects of mathematical sets familiar in discrete mathematics (for example Venn diagrams and symbolic reasoning about their Boolean algebra), and suffices for the everyday use of set theory concepts in contemporary mathematics.
Axiomatic systemIn mathematics and logic, an axiomatic system is any set of axioms from which some or all axioms can be used in conjunction to logically derive theorems. A theory is a consistent, relatively-self-contained body of knowledge which usually contains an axiomatic system and all its derived theorems. An axiomatic system that is completely described is a special kind of formal system. A formal theory is an axiomatic system (usually formulated within model theory) that describes a set of sentences that is closed under logical implication.
EquiconsistencyIn mathematical logic, two theories are equiconsistent if the consistency of one theory implies the consistency of the other theory, and vice versa. In this case, they are, roughly speaking, "as consistent as each other". In general, it is not possible to prove the absolute consistency of a theory T. Instead we usually take a theory S, believed to be consistent, and try to prove the weaker statement that if S is consistent then T must also be consistent—if we can do this we say that T is consistent relative to S.
Zermelo set theoryZermelo set theory (sometimes denoted by Z-), as set out in a seminal paper in 1908 by Ernst Zermelo, is the ancestor of modern Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF) and its extensions, such as von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory (NBG). It bears certain differences from its descendants, which are not always understood, and are frequently misquoted. This article sets out the original axioms, with the original text (translated into English) and original numbering.
Set theorySet theory is the branch of mathematical logic that studies sets, which can be informally described as collections of objects. Although objects of any kind can be collected into a set, set theory, as a branch of mathematics, is mostly concerned with those that are relevant to mathematics as a whole. The modern study of set theory was initiated by the German mathematicians Richard Dedekind and Georg Cantor in the 1870s. In particular, Georg Cantor is commonly considered the founder of set theory.
Gödel's incompleteness theoremsGödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that are concerned with the limits of in formal axiomatic theories. These results, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The theorems are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible. The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.
